Supreme Court Versus the Constitution

Constitutionally, the right to amend the Constitution in India lies with Parliament alone. In recent years, however, and in an atmosphere of judicial activism, the Supreme Court has gone beyond its role as interpreter of the Constitution, becoming its arbiter. There is thus scope in India's federal structure for an impasse between the Supreme Court and Parliament which will not be resolved by referring to the Constitution. Written against this background, this collection of essays by eminent parliamentarians, jurists, legal experts and journalists examines various aspects of this important issue, including: - the doctrine of `basic structure', and the complex responses to and consequences of this doctrine; - judicial review in India, in relation to the superiority of Parliament in the UK and the virtually unlimited scope of judicial review by the US Supreme Court; - `due process of law' and its applicability in India; - the electoral system and the threat of majoritarianism; - federalism in India: Parliament and the state legislatures; - The Supreme Court's creativity in interpreting the Constitution but the continuing absence of clear constitutional principles despite this. - the Court's role as the protector of fundamental rights. Written in an accessible style, this book is a of interested to academic reseearchers and practitioners in government studies, constitutional issues, law and politics.