Tactical Control of Air Mobility Forces in Operation Allied Force

This project reviews the transfer of tactical control (TACON) of air mobility forces in ALLIED FORCE, the 1999 Air War over Serbia. The researcher addresses a doctrinal perspective as well as examines whether the current command and control (C 2) structure supports the doctrine. From the available information, the author finds that the current Joint and USAF doctrines not only adequately address TACON of air mobility forces, but also provide an alternative command relationship of Direct Support. However, the author finds that the current C 2 structure does not sustain the existing doctrine in every theater. In this way, the C 2 system only provides restricted Global Reach Current Joint and USAF doctrine establishes the option to transfer TACON of forces when it's wise to do so. Yet, TACON is unwise in some regions of the world because the existing C 2 capability is not sufficient. Direct Support provides a reasonable alternative, but improving the C 2 system will enhance both options. By strengthening the theater mobility planning staff and developing a consolidated dispatch center for theater as well as global mission management, air mobility forces can enhance support to the war fighter. This will simplify the C 2 system as well as present a consistent structure to every level from the supported Joint Forces Commander to the aircrew and mission support personnel. Revamping the C 2 system into a global resource will enable air mobility forces to better support doctrine through the transfer of TACON or provision of Direct Support independent of the area of operation.