Is there a structural or a political fault in the fiscal governance of the EU?

Thesis (M.A.) from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: Merit, London School of Economics (European Institute), course: Politics and Government in the EU, language: English, abstract: The non-compliance to the Stability and Growth Pact in the early 2000's was a direct challenge to the co-operative virtue of EU fiscal governance, and the fact that its occurrence played little role in affecting the stability for Europe's most significant achievement yet - the Single Currency - was in itself a truly peculiar incident. Betrayed by the deeds of the two locomotives of the European Project, Germany and France, only four years after the adoption of the Euro - yet the currency strides on and none of the adverse effect that Economists feared had happened. But was that it? The fact that both of these nations could escape sanction by coercing other nations in debt to vote against a punishment for their excessive fiscal deficit announced a deep functional fault in the enforcement of agreed EU treaties on the Commission's part; and knowing that the stability of the Euro hinged upon an incomplete fiscal federation where fiscal responsibility laid heavily on the shoulders of the member states, there was indeed a commitment crisis exhibiting itself in 2003. This paper aimed to answer two questions: first, what have caused the member states, such as France and most curiously, Germany, the one who had stressed the need for fiscal discipline every step of the way during the negotiation stage to safeguard the Euro, to renegade on a pact that was supposed to guarantee just that? Second, in light of the silence of the international capital market towards the incident, what, if any, had the demise of EDP contributed to the study of fiscal governance and political integration in the EU?