Explanation and Experiment in Social Psychological Science

The book is about explanation and experiment in social psychological science. It argues that traditional empiricist accounts and hermeneutical critiques are fundamentally misconceived. The main purpose of the book is to demonstrate the possibility and potential of a causal and experimental science of meaningful human action. The most important feature of the work is the innovative integration of a realist philosophy of science and a social constitutionist philosophy of human action. This challenging new perspective preserves the objectivity of action identification and explanation while remaining sensitive to the social, relational and representational dimensions of human action. It argues that traditional problems concerning the generalizability of experimental results are misconceived. Instead it focuses upon the critical issue concerning the identity of experimentally produced behaviors. The volume should appeal to those practitioners of social psychological science who recognize the conceptual poverty of traditional empiricism, but who are disinclined to abandon the discipline to the relativist extremes of social constructionism. It should also appeal to all those human scientists and philosophers concerned with the potential of a scientific analysis of meaningful human action.