Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States

The 2008 National Defense Strategy identifies promoting security as one of the nation's strategic objectives, using Security Force Assistance (SFA) as a method to build partner capacity. The primary threat addressed is violent extremist organizations operating in failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Current doctrine with respect to Security Force Assistance is inconsistent in its explanation of various critical principles as well as ambiguous in addressing the "whole of government" approach that is vital to conducting these types of operations. Additionally, definitions of violent extremist organizations and failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas vary both domestically across the interagency as well as internationally, creating confusion at the strategic level that translates to the operational and tactical levels. Presented first in this thesis are analyses of Security Force Assistance doctrine in its current state and of the definitions of violent extremist organizations and failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Presented next are two historical case studies of Security Force Assistance operations: Somalia and Colombia. These case studies examine Security Force Assistance operations of varying intensity in failed and potentially failing states that contain violent extremist organizations. This thesis identifies anomalies in doctrine, particularly with respect to incorporation of the interagency and the integration of the elements of national power outside of the military. This thesis by identifying Security Force Assistance doctrinal gaps that are critical to the efficacy of the concept in failed states and ungoverned areas.