Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology

The present anthology offers a unique collection of papers focusing on the current discussion about the so-called dual-process theories within the field of moral psychology. In general, dual-process theories state that in cognitive systems, two sorts of processes can be differentiated: an affective, associative process and an analytical, rule-based process. This distinction recently entered the debate on the relationship between intuitive and rational approaches to explaining the phenomenon of moral judgment. Dual-process theories within moral psychology argue that we have to differentiate between an automatic, intuitive, unconscious decision-making process that guides our everyday moral behavior and elaborated rational arguments that serve to discuss and question our intuitions and to elude them if necessary. Arguments from dual-process theories of moral behavior are not only vividly discussed within metaethics but entered disciplines like, e.g., political theory and educational sciences as well. The increasing interest in these theories raises questions concerning their general impact on social developments. The anthology aims at presenting stepping stones of an analysis of the merits and drawbacks of this development. For that purpose, philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, sociologists, theologians, political scientists, educational scientists, and legal scientists discuss general questions concerning the relationship between ethics and empirical sciences, methodological questions, reassessments of established terminology and societal implications of dual-process theories in moral psychology.