Considerations for the Distribution of Antiarmor Weapons

Since the appearance of the first tanks during World War I, soldiers have been searching for weapons to combat the armored threat and the most effective organizational structure within which to employ them. Ideally, every soldier could be issued an antiarmor weapon, but for most of the tank's history, effective antiarmor weapons have been too large, complex, or expensive to allow mass distribution. A compromise is necessary between the need for tactical protection against individual and small groups of tanks and the ability to mass antiarmor weapons offensively or defensively at the operational level. This study reviews the history of U.S. antiarmor weapons, doctrine, and organization since the 1930's and tests the hypothesis that there are certain considerations that have been significant in the successful distribution of antiarmor weapons. Four periods of history are studied. The first of these is the pre-World War II years, 1939-1940. The second is that period, 1940-1944, between introduction of the German 'blitzkrieg' and the Allied invasion of Normandy. The third period covers U.S. Army operation in the European Theater of Operations, 1944-1945. The final period is from 1946 until the present. The author concludes that four considerations have been significant in the successful distribution of antiarmor weapons: perception of the threat, technology, doctrine, and resource constraints. Failure to properly address any one of these has consistently caused a later major reorganization of antiarmor weapons. The author suggests that these considerations should be carefully examined by force planners developing future antiarmor weapons, doctrine, and organization. Several possible applications to the Army of Excellence are included in the concluding chapter of the study.